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Abstract
The ability of the Program Offices to provide accurate cost estimates is an
essential element in planning and programming. Historically, cost estimating has led to
budget overruns and continues to be an area of scrutiny and concern. A series of
legislative reforms have sought to address each of these perceived underlying causes
which are located at all levels of decision making – from the SPO to CADE. The current
study is specifically interested in determining how well SPOs are doing. There have not
been comprehensive studies on SPO performance. In large part, this deficiency is due to
the inability to systematically assess the SPOs. However, a new consolidation of data by
AFLCMC has recently made it possible to do such a study. The AFLCMC’s program
office estimates in this study will look at the SPOs of AFLCMC and evaluate their cost
estimates for growth and determine if their established method of self-assessment
provides a predictor of the overall future accuracy of the program estimate.
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THE UTILITY OF SELF-ASSESSMENT IN PREDICTING PROGRAM OFFICE
ESTIMATE ACCURACY

I. Introduction
Background
The ability of the Program Offices to provide accurate cost estimates is an
essential element in planning and programming. Historically, cost estimating has led to
budget overruns and continues to be an area of scrutiny and concern. A series of
legislative reforms have sought to address each of these perceived underlying causes
which are located at all levels of decision making – from the System Program Office
(SPO) to Cost Assessment and Data Enterprise (CADE). From the 1983 Nunn-McCurdy
Act, and continuing with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, the Federal
Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, as well as the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (WSARA) legislation has tried to reduce cost growth (Schwartz, 2016). Even
with reform, cost growth continues to be an issue within the Air Force. The issues may
involve numerous agents within the complex corporate structure of estimating, as well as
planning and programming. How well SPOs are doing, and the quality and value of their
self-assessment tools is the specific subject of the current study. There has been no
comprehensive studies on SPO performance. The lack of research is due, in large part, to
the inability to systematically assess SPOs. However, with the support of Air Force Life
Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) providing access to their historical records and
database, it is now possible to do such a study.
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Problem Statement
A common conclusion is that cost growth has remained an issue despite intensive
efforts at reform. A 2007 RAND study noted that in the three decades prior cost growth
remained high, with no significant improvement (Younossi, 2007). More recently, the
GAO concluded that most programs continue to proceed without the key knowledge of
technologies, design, cost, and schedule, essential to good acquisition outcomes (GAO,
2018).
It is not clear, however, how well SPOs, in particular, are doing. The indictments
above alight upon a variety of agents, but not necessarily the SPOs. The reason is that the
program baseline is established through a corporate process. And that process involves
higher authorities who ultimately choose the baseline. Those authorities for the Air Force
process is the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) and then the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD-CAPE). Their
involvement is one of developing their own independent estimates, and reaching a single
one based on the multiple perspectives. The GAO goes so far as to say that the most
robust study, and thus most credible and important, is the one conducted by AFCAA
(GAO, 2009). It is important to note that in the traditional documentation and the ensuing
literature, the SPO’s initial estimate is generally shrouded and lost – it accuracy left to be
an unknown for systematic review.
The current study intends to address two primary gaps identified in literature on
the current state of cost estimating by those working with Air Force SPOs. First, using
the AFLCMC’s internal program office estimates, which have been retained in
PowerPoint slide shows used in program reviews, this study can finally systematically
2

determine the accuracy of SPO. AFLCMC has provided 480 program offices estimates
spanning sixteen year of historical data for research. The hope is this data will aid in
determining the accuracy provides an important commentary on the SPOs’ value in the
process. Much is made of the need for independent estimates to account for potential
bias within the SPO. Namely, the SPO could be too invested in a program to identify
problems. Or, the SPO could be too close to the contractors to properly scrutinize their
actions. But the personnel in SPOs have easy access to the same publications that make
these claims as anyone else. Most likely, these publications were part of their own
training and education. It would seem, then, that through a self-awareness, internal
checks might overcome biases, and professionalism trump cronyism. In the end, one must
put the question of accuracy to the test. Until now, there has been no way to
systematically do so.
Second, this study can provide a new way to address the common sentiment
contained within the GAO’s claim: DoD lacks key knowledge for good estimating. Such
a claim is uncontested in a general sense. Cost estimators recognize that their knowledge
is imperfect. Creating new technologies, aiming for new metrics, and employing new
engineering process all involve uncertainties. One would like a better-defined end goal,
or better historical analogies, or perfectly prescient subject matter experts. But lacking
these, cost estimators as a profession deal with uncertainty, and they do so in systematic
ways. Numerous handbooks and guides set the methods for quantifying uncertainty, and
these methods involve, most commonly, the utilization of variance parameters. The
eventual baseline, then, represents merely a “most likely” point within a range of possible
outcomes. But a novel question would be to ask how they internalize this deficiency of
3

knowledge and communicate it in an internal business process. That is to say that a
“most likely” estimate is a best one can produce, but whether that is the 50th percentile of
the 70th using the esoteric language of statistics, what is the general sentiment in common
parlance, and discourse? The PowerPoint slides retained by AFLCMC allow one to
glance behind the numbers and begin to understand the relationship between knowledge
and confidence in a different way, one that perhaps inputs the people, the culture, and the
business environment back into the study of DoD and its long term reform initiatives.
SPO documentation shows that SPOs have employed an internal device, an
internal review process, since 2003 with the aim of qualitatively assessing the end
product. This review is a business process tool. Such tools have been studied within
business literature, but have received scant attention in DoD acquisitions literature. The
question for this second study, then, will be to determine if such a tool has worth within
DoD, namely by accurately predicting future problems and successes.
Figure 1 shows a representative self-assessment tool that has been in place at
AFLCMC since 2003, and which will be at the center of this second study. The figure is
a Program Confidence Pedigree. Although there are minor variations of this pedigree
format, they all have in common the scale of confidence of Green, Yellow, and Red.
Each SPO has available the descriptions of what these colors represent. (Appendices A to
C). This scale is used to assess seven different “confidence enabler” categories that
comprise the pedigree. Together these seven enablers permit an Overall Assessment.
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PROGRAM "Confidence" PEDIGREE
"PROGRAM REALISM is needed to achieve COST
REALISM"
Program Name:

Program Phase:

Confidence Enablers

EMD

Prod

O&S

Requirements Definition
Engineering Technical Baseline
Schedule Baseline
Cost Data & Methodology
Crosschecks
Risk Assessment
(Cost/Schedule/Tech)
Budget Equals Estimate

Overall Assessment

Figure 1: Program Pedigree Confidence Self-Assessment
This study of self-assessment data could lead to further answering the problems of
cost growth as well as giving insight to program offices’ ability to assess themselves. An
important part of reform is the establishment of repeatable systems for internal controls.
While AFLCMC has employed this internal control, it remains to be determined whether
its personnel have employed it in a manner that would head off problems. It is credible to
think that something so summary might lead to shrouded inputs with derogatory colors of
yellow and red being underrepresented.
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses
The self-assessment tool contains numerous elements, each yielding potentially
important information. It is a rich source of data that has yet to be mined. The following
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questions represent what the study deems to be the most relevant for a first assessment of
the tool.
1. Does confidence in a program increase through the course of a program, as one
would expect if the tool has some general validity?
2. What is the value of program office overall self-assessments as predictors of
cost estimating accuracy?
3. Which of the self-assessment confidence enablers are most predictive of future
variance?
4. When does a program office self-assessment peak in confidence during a
program? When does confidence stabilize in a program?
5. To what extent can we attribute changes in program estimates to factors
controllable by cost estimators?
6. Have cost estimates improved over time within the SPO? And has the
technique of self-assessment proved more valuable over time?
Methodology
The AFLCMC database was used for data collection and variables that are used in
the analysis. The data was analyzed through descriptive statistics, contingency tables and
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models. Descriptive statistics will describe the
basic features of the dataset. Contingency tables are used to set up the relationship
between the program office assessments and different cost growth or cost variance
thresholds and the regression model will estimate the relationship between a dependent
variable the independent variables.

6

Research Contribution
The predominant focus of this research is to provide the Program Office data on
their self-assessments and look at how they aligned with their estimates to see if they
have improved over time. The results of the research provide AFLCMC and other DoD
entities potential insight into the how Program offices view their methods and potentially
provide avenues for better cost estimates. Results of the study may not apply to all
acquisition program types, but may provide key information for program offices to
improve cost estimates.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter first discusses the Program Office’s Estimates (POE) and their
estimation techniques. Then it looks at Cost Growth studies and research, factors of cost
growth, and then cost growth modeling. Lastly, the chapter reviews the self-assessment
literature, looking at the value it brings to organizations, issues with self-assessment, and
how it can be fully utilized in program office cost estimation.
Program Office Estimates
POEs are detailed estimates of acquisition costs normally required for high-level
decisions. The POE is a full Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) which is initially built by
the program office staff early in the program’s life (GAO, 2009). Estimates are then
produced on a recurring basis which are tied to major program reviews to include
Milestones A, B, and C or to acquire funding for program changes throughout its lifespan
(GAO, 2009).
The POEs serve numerous purposes. The initial program estimate serves as the
base point for all subsequent tracking and auditing purposes (DAU, 2019). Further, the
POE is used at acquisition program milestones and decision reviews to assess whether the
system’s cost is affordable and/or consistent for long-range investment and force
structure plans. These estimates are also the basis for budget requests to Congress as a
vehicle for inputs to the programming and budgeting phases of the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution process (PPBE) (DAU, 2019).
8

POEs are mandated and governed at the Department of Defense (DoD) level. The
policies and procedures for the preparation of POEs for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) programs at key
acquisition events, as well as the requirements for cost data collection, are described in
the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.73 (DAU, 2019). This regulation
mandates that the POE be presented to OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
(CAPE) prior to milestones required to create an Independent Cost Estimates (ICE) for
all Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and IA programs.
Program Offices utilize multiple methods to come up with their estimates. They
use the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) as a framework for cost estimation, program
planning and reporting. The WBS defines the total system to be developed or produced
(AcqNotes, 2019). There are 4 Cost Estimating Categories for LCC: Research and
Development, Investment, Operating and Support, and Disposal (DoD 5000.4) The LCCs
are divided into the five major Appropriations Categories. Research, Development Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E), Procurement; Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Military
Construction (MILCON), Military Personnel (MILPERS) (AcqNotes, 2019) Funding is
received in the respective cost category under applicable appropriation.
There are a number of cost estimating techniques that can be used to develop a
program office estimate. The main techniques are: Analogy, Engineering Estimate,
Parametric, and Actual Cost. The first method discussed is an analogy. It is often used
when a program is very early in its life cycle and it does not have a detailed breakdown or
actuals to build its estimate. It often uses historical actuals from an analogous program
for its estimate (GAO, 2009). Analogy assumes similar characteristics for the new
9

weapons systems to historical weapon systems and can use complexity factors that
account for new technology from subject matter experts (SME). Its benefit is that it is
quick to develop but on the downside, they are subjective epically when there is no
historical weapon system that is a direct match to a new weapon system (GAO, 2009)
Another method is engineering build-up. It relies on the detail of the weapon
system’s WBS. The more details, the more accurate the estimate will be. It starts at the
lowest WBS level and adds or builds from there. Each level is added to the next until all
components and levels are calculated. While it can identify cost drivers, it can be very
time consuming and very reliant on good data. If the data is not available at the lowest
level then engineering build-up estimates becomes very difficult (GAO, 2009).
Parametric cost estimating uses statistical methods such as regression to develop a
Cost Estimating Relationship (CER). This method uses the CER to predict the future
costs of a new weapon system based on the historical data. Regression is a common
method used in developing a CER because it allows the estimator to make statistical
inferences that are important to consider when using parametric estimating (GAO, 2009).
Finally, actual costs use trends from prototypes or early production items to project
estimates of future costs for the same system. These projections may be made at various
levels of detail, depending on the availability of data, without the data actuals cannot be
calculated.
There are other methods and the viability of these methods that will be discussed
further as the cost growth literature looks at how useful and accurate cost estimating
methods are. The discussed cost estimation methods are utilized by the program offices
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for estimates to try and limit cost growth. The literature on cost growth cites the
estimation methods among some of the known causes for growth.
Cost estimation is described as a science and an art. The ever-increasing
complexity of technology, software density, system integration complexity, and the like
make estimating a total system’s development cost, at the inception of major
development activities, an increasingly challenging endeavor (Younossi, 2007).
If the strength of initial program estimating accuracy cannot improve, then continued
monitoring and tracking of the cost growth is required. Next, with the knowledge of a
program office and how they get their estimates, the literature will dive into cost growth
and how it is assessed or categorized.
Cost Growth
Cost growth is an ongoing DOD issue. From the literature, cost growth is defined
as “the difference between the initial estimate of the total acquisition cost for a program
and the most recent or final estimate adjusted for inflation and quantity changes”
(Jarvaise et. al, 1996). Others define cost growth as the tendency of the unit cost of a
system to increase during the course of the acquisition process (Singer, 1982). The
impact of cost growth is that it compromises the ability of DoD to procure the total
number and type of weapon systems needed to meet mission requirements. For this
research Jarvaise’s definition is in line with our data collected.
Now that cost growth has been defined, there have been numerous RAND and
AFIT studies on cost growth. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research
organization providing objective analysis and solutions to challenges facing the public
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and private sectors. Early studies include Drezner who studied Cost Growth Factors
(CGF) in weapon systems. For 128 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)
Drezner found a 20% cost growth from the initial baseline estimate through the life cycle
of the program (Drezner, 1993). Additionally, the GAO Analysis of DOD Major Defense
Acquisition Program 2008 Portfolios stated that change from the first estimate was 26%
cost growth (GAO, 2009). However, other cost growth studies said that this number is
too conservative. IDA and RAND studies looked to better capture the full extent of cost
growth over program’s entire lifecycle. They showed average adjusted total cost growth
for the completed program is 46% from MS II and 16% from MS III, about 20% higher
growth than the previously studied (Arena, 2006). With the magnitude of cost growth
now understood the review focuses on the reasons or factors leading to cost growth.
The factors responsible for cost growth have been identified in several ways. In
early studies factors where identified. Since then they have been built upon by more
recent research. Table 1 Searle’s research developed factors for cost growth specifically:
Planning Difficulties, Risk Elements, and Management Inefficiencies.

Table 1: Factors Affecting Cost Growth (Searle, 1999)
Planning Difficulties

Risk Elements

Management Inefficiencies

1) Incomplete Definition of
Work
2) Interface Incompatibilities

6) Unforeseeable Conditions

11) Disorganized Work
Direction and Productivity
12) Subcontracting

3) Changes; Failure to
Anticipate Needs.
4) Estimating Uncertainties;
Poor Estimating
5) Optimistic Assumptions

7) Unpredictable Regulatory
Funding delays
8) Unforeseen Technical
Difficulties
9) Uncontrollable Forces
10) Unanticipated Economic
Conditions
12

13) Unnecessary Work or
“Gold Plating”
14) Project Control
15) Work Load Projections

These show, first, that planning difficulties tend to prevent realistic and early
estimates of the final cost of a program. Second, risk elements are the factors inherent to
the system and are neither controllable nor predictable. Finally, management
inefficiencies are the factors that are considered as controllable by the management. He
found planning difficulties and management inefficiencies only played a minor role in
growth with much of the growth in uncontrollable risk elements (Searle, 1999). His
findings suggest that a significant amount of cost growth is outside of estimation and due
to uncontrollable factors for the SPO -- an important idea when related to what extent can
we attribute changes in program estimates to controllable factors.
In another early study, Calcutt identified five factors: requirements definition, cost
estimating, program management, contracting, and budgetary. “Requirements
Definition” refers to poor initial requirement definition, poor performance/cost trade-offs
during development, and changes in quantity requirements. “Cost Estimating” refers to
errors due to limitations of cost estimating procedures, poor inflation estimates, top down
pressure to reduce estimates, and a lack of valid independent cost estimates. “Program
Management” refers to the lack of program management expertise,
mismanagement/human error, over optimism, and schedule concurrency. “Contracting”
refers to the lack of competition, use of wrong type of contract, inconsistent contract
management/administrative procedures, and too much contractor oversight and reporting
requirements. (5) “Budgetary” refers to funding instabilities within DoD, funding
instabilities caused by congressional decisions, and inefficient production rates due to
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stretching out programs. This approach facilitates correlating the factors attributed to cost
growth with the initiatives DoD has taken to reduce cost growth. (Calcutt, 1993).
More recent studies have shown different cost growth factors. Deneve focusing on
the issues with DoD cost estimating instead of post-estimation drivers. He focused on
what they were estimating and not the not the accuracy of the cost estimate. He found
four categorical variables with strong relationships to cost growth factors: program type,
iteration, funding years, and the number of services. The Cost Growth Factors (CGF)
were predictors of the total cost from the baseline estimate with 71 % of initial estimates
are made better by at least correcting in the direction indicated by the predicted CGF
(Deneve, 2015).
Arena found three major categories affecting cost growth: schedule factors,
acquisition strategy, and other factors. The study identified schedule slip and program
duration as the factors that affects cost growth with total program CGFs. Although there
was mixed evidence of the effectiveness of acquisition strategies, the study found cost
growth due to decisions outside of the control of program managers increased program
costs(Arena, 2006).
Finally, Bolten looked at SARs, finding cost growth or variance tied to the
following categories: quantity, schedule, engineering, estimating, economic, other, and
support. These variance categories along with how they classified the variance data
showed the “realized” cost growth. The cost growth was found to be in four major
categories: (1) errors in estimation and planning, (2) decisions by the government, (3)
financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous sources. Of the four major categories, decisions
by the government dominate the overall growth in both development and procurement.
14

For development, decisions account for 31% of the 57% cost growth; for procurement,
they account for 57% of the 75% cost growth (Bolten, 2008). The factors of discussed in
the literature above are similar to what the POE database from our research uses as
categories when explaining reasons for change in cost estimates and relates to research
question five.
These similar factors give credence to the SPOs using them as a bases for
identifying and categorizing cost growth. It is important to have a standardized
methodology in this categorization. Proper cost growth identification can help identify
problem areas and differences among programs.
Cost growth literature has shown the magnitude and factors of it. Table 2 provides
a list of the AFIT studies, specifically, in recent years.
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Table 2: AFIT Cost Growth Research
Moore &
White
White et
al.
2004
Lucas
Using
Logistic
and
Rossetti
Multiple
& White
Regressio
nBielecki
to
Estimate
& White
Engineeri
Genest &
ng
Cost
White
Risk
Monaco
& White
McDaniel
& White
Foreman
Rusnock

2003 A Regression Approach for Estimating Procurement Cost
2004 Using Logistic and Multiple Regression to Estimate Engineering
Cost
2004 Risk
Creating Cost Growth Models for the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Phase of Acquisition Using Logistic and
Multiple Regression
2004 A Two-Pronged Approach to Estimate Procurement Cost Growth in
Major DoD Weapon Systems
2005 Estimating Cost Growth From Schedule Changes: A Regression
Approach
2005 Predicting RDT&E Cost Growth
2005 Extending Cost Growth Estimation to Predict Schedule Risk
2007 Predicting Engineering and Schedule Procurement Cost Growth for
Major DoD Programs
2007 Predicting the Effect of Longitudinal Variables on Cost and
Schedule Performance
2008 Predicting Cost and Schedule Growth For Military and Civil Space
Systems
2015 Time Phasing Aircraft R&D Using the Weibull and Beta Distributions

Brown et
al.
Kozlak et. 2016 Predicting Cost Growth Using Programs Reviews and Milestones for DoD
al
Aircraft
D’Amico 2017 A Longitudinal Study and Color Rating System of Acquisition Cost
Growth
AFIT studies have used historical data and regression analysis to estimate cost
growth. First, White et al. developed a seven-variable cost growth model with funding

variables, time variable, and length of program predicting cost growth. Others followed
the early works of White et al. utilizing this research in predicting cost growth (White et
al., 2004). Bielecki et al. (2005) and Moore et al. (2005) generated models to predict cost
growth in different funding appropriations using regression analysis. Moore et al. (2005)
16

modeled procurement cost growth during the EMD phase. Bielecki et al. (2005) modeled
RDT&E budget cost growth during the EMD phase of the program lifecycle.
Further studies by Lucas (2004), Rosetti et al. (2004), Genest et al. (2005),
McDaniel et al., (2007) furthered the ability to predict cost growth in DoD weapon
systems. Lucas (2004) focused on developing a model to predict a range or variance of
cost growth. Rossetti et al. (2004) modeled procurement and support costs during the
EMD phase. Genest et al., (2005) modeled the pre EMD phase of a weapon system to
predict cost growth. Monaco et al. (2005) modeled the predicted schedule risk. McDaniel
et al., (2007) modeled cost risk early in EMD looking reduce cost growth. Foreman
(2007) furthered Monaco et al predicting schedule slip and using this to predict cost
growth. Rusnock (2008) modeled cost estimators in predicting schedule growth in space
systems. Deneve et al. (2015) as discussed in the cost growth factors previously modeled
more realistic cost estimates using factors for cost growth while at AFIT.
Brown et al. (2015) studied development expenditures at 50% program
completion. He compared commonly cited 60/40 “rule of thumb,” which assumes 60%
expenditures at 50% schedule. Finding the estimation of budgets by 6.5% higher, on
average 60/40 model. Kozlak et al. (2016) modeled cost growth factors as predictors of
cost growth at the four reviews finding that at 6.5 years after MS-B a program sustains
about 91% of the total program cost growth. D’Amico et al. (2017) modeled a color
rating matrix for cost growth factors finding RDT&E having the biggest impact. His
color rating mirror the self-assessment inputs of this study, however the cost growth
outputs this study not similar.
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Self-Assessment
The program office estimates have conducted self-assessments since 2003. The
SPOs however, have not utilized the self-assessment as a tool observe the estimates. The
specific measures could identify causes in lower overall confidence in the program and
potentially greater variance in cost estimation. Self-assessment have long been studied to
determine their validity as a tool for improvement. The literature shows self-assessments
can be an organizational improvement tool increasing effectiveness and efficiency
through introspection. Additionally, it has found multiple key points to assessing value.
Such tools could be a useful method for cost estimation improvement within program
offices and provide a tool for cost estimators and managers.
A self-assessment tool is valuable because it has shown that organizations can
track policies and programs over focused areas and identify actions to strengthen
procedures and improve performance (Keyser et. al, 2008). By using self-assessment
tools, an organization can determine how to solve problems and react to pressure. SelfAssessment needs to have organizational buy-in and clear guidance for the outcomes
properly implemented.
Self-assessments need some sort of framework or structure when being
developed. This can be achieved through the integration of key requirements. Stecher
studied the framework for organizational self-assessments. It contained seven criteria that
form the basis for organizational self-assessments: Leadership, Strategic planning,
Customer and market focus, Information and analysis, Human resource focus, Process
management, and Business results. (Stecher et. al, 2004). These criteria are their pillars
for the basis for organizational self-assessments.
18

Organizations must also be able to provide exceptional service within an
appropriate budget. “Performance is increasingly judged by the efficiency of the
organization by the cost per service, the number of outputs per employee, the number of
outputs per person per year, or the average value of grants per person” (Lusthaus et. al,
1999). No matter how large an organization is, it viewed by the value they provide both
quantitative and qualitatively.
The literature has established the importance of self-assessment criteria being
identified and the proper framework established. The research studied in this thesis
utilized the categories from The Program “Confidence” Pedigree Self-Assessment and
Overall Confidence previously seen in Figure 1 as the framework for self-assessment.

Organizations often conduct self-assessments, rate performance and manage
strategic issues, with an end goal of improved performance. Organizational selfassessment can be a useful tool to implement change or adjust planning to improve
performance. “Self-assessment is based on a detailed organizational profile and a
strategic plan linked to clearly identified goals and reinforced by an information and
analysis system to collect data and monitor progress toward those goals” (Stecher et. al,
2004). Effectiveness of reaching those goals can be difficult to assess, a clearly defined
mission statement is needed for the organization to assess effectiveness.
Lusthaus identified the shift from Assessment to ‘Self-Assessment’ in an
organization relies on a model to guide the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
a targeted organization. For organizational assessment to realize its potential, assessors
need to engage in a teacher-learner type of relationships with the source requiring the
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information as well as the one providing it. Collecting and analyze specific objective
data, and then ‘teach’ managers about their organizations. (Lusthaus et. al, 1999)
A direct participatory approaches by the technical expertise of the evaluator with
perspectives from inside the organization allows for the best gathering of information.
“This self-assessment process not only teaches the members of an organization how to
collect and analyze data by themselves, it guides them while making decisions based on
it, drawing conclusions, and generating solutions” (Lusthaus et. al, 1999) Self-assessment
can be defined as a ‘learning process’ some organizations may support a brainstorming
stage for more information before making a decision, others need technical support with
tools and instruments to guide them. Lusthaus studies are extensive in the process of how
to properly build a self-assessment. It is up to the organization correctly build and utilize
this effective tool and helps answer research question one when determining the value of
self-assessment as a predictor.
Improving effectiveness and efficiency are primary reasons for self-assessments.
Bartuseviciene’s research focused on utilizing self-assessment for in these two areas.
They utilized a mixed-method approach to determine if an organization had the
prerequisites to learn from the evaluation. Then a real-time study of the organization and
self-evaluation were implemented. The results of Bartuseviciene indicated the need for
supportive organizational contexts, structures, and processes of evaluation used for
learning is to occur throughout the organization. (Bartuseviciene, 2013) Feedback shows
that self-assessment has a positive impact. The act of engaging in a reflective process
about one’s work, including focusing on outcomes and evaluation should ideally not just
be an afterthought to programming.
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However, the participants of the study were not sure how the self-assessment
study could apply to their daily work and voiced concerns for further content clarification
as well as continuous implementation support if self-assessment become an integrated
practice. (Bartuseviciene, 2013) The study’s intent was to aid managers striving for better
performance results.
The research found that effectiveness and efficiency are performance measures
that organizations can use to assess their performance. “Efficiency is oriented towards
successful input transformation into outputs, where effectiveness measures how outputs
interact with the economic and social environment” (Bartuseviciene, 2013). Selfassessment can be applied to team of workers or overall organizations to help identify
strengths and weaknesses and improve performance. With proper feedback as well as
evaluation for supervisors, peers, and subordinates, employees evaluate their own
performance and participate in setting goals. The research supported self-assessment is a
valuable and useful tool for organizations, provided that it is properly administered and
reviewed.
Efforts have been done develop models for organizational self-assessments. Siow
developed a multiple-attribute decision-making (MADM) modeling framework and
methodology (Siow, 2018). The model scored self-assessments and focused on initial
development and application for management. It can use thousands of criteria and several
alternatives in the assessment. The model’s applications are varied including project
management and organizational self-assessments. It was proven valid and reliable when
applied to real data (Soiw, 2018) the research in this study uses the program office overall
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confidence self-assessment to try and model cost growth predictors in contrast to the
specific models of self-assessment just discussed.
Not all research supports self-assessment. Dunning studied the empirical evidence
on flaws in self-assessment. Research into a wide variety of domains examined how
accurately people judge themselves. Finding, “first a fairly small correlations between
personal perceptions and objective performance. Second, people tend to be too optimistic
about skill, expertise, and future prospects” (Dunning, 2004). Kolar studied selfassessment vs outside assessment. Results slightly favored the predictive validity of
judgement made by single acquaintance over self-judgment. “It significantly favored the
aggregate judgment of two acquaintances over self-judgment. These findings imply that
the most valid source judgment may not be self-assessment but the consensus of multiple
peer assessors” (Kolar, 1996).
Harris completed a meta-analysis on the reviews of self–supervisor, self–peer, and
peer–supervisor ratings. They measured the mean correlation values of the three groups
with the closer the ρ was to 1 the higher level of correlation. “The results indicated a
relatively high correlation between peer and supervisor ratings (ρ= .62) but only a
moderate correlation between self‐supervisor (ρ= .35) and self‐peer ratings (ρ= .36)”
(Harris, 1988). The analysis looks at how the supervisor’s, peers, and the assessor’s
views are different. The results show peer and supervisor assessment were closer related
than one’s own self-assessment when compared. This questions who should do the
assessment.
The literature shows there is value in self-assessment, but this is limited by the
methods used. Self-assessment models have been be made to produce better assessments,
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but these can be limited as assessor tend to over judge their self-performance. The
literature supports supervisor and peer reviews of self-assessment and this can be noted
as a best practice for the program office overall confidence self-assessments.
Summary
There is little literature on cost estimation within program offices, but there is a
vast amount on cost growth, estimates and factors for mitigation. The literature also
shows that in spite of regulation, there is still little system-wide improvement in cost
estimating. Additionally, the program office only has a role to play in estimates and many
factors are beyond their controls. Self-assessment can be a valuable tool for organizations
as it may help them improve effectiveness and efficiency. In order to be implemented, it
needs to have organizational buy-in, clear guidance, and the outcomes properly
understood. Chapter III goes into methodology of the data collection and analysis for the
self-assessment of program office estimates.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The first part of this chapter covers the data source and database, and then goes
into how the data was collected and variables that are used in the analysis. Then the
chapter covers the methodology for the contingency tables and Fisher’s Exact Tests.
Contingency tables are used to set up the relationship between the program office
assessments and different cost growth or cost variance thresholds, while the Fisher’s
Exact Tests test for statistical significance.
Data Source/Database Summary
The data for this research comes from Air Force Life Cycle Management
(AFLCMC) Program Office Estimates (POE) briefing slides. They were used to retrieve
all of the self-assessment data from the Program Pedigree Confidence slide Figure 2
below. The data was then recorded within a database for all the measure as well as
overall confidence. The set of programs range from ACAT I to ACAT III.
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PROGRAM "Confidence" PEDIGREE
"PROGRAM REALISM is needed to achieve COST
REALISM"
Program Name:

Program Phase:

Confidence Enablers

EMD

Prod

O&S

Requirements Definition
Engineering Technical Baseline
Schedule Baseline
Cost Data & Methodology
Crosschecks
Risk Assessment
(Cost/Schedule/Tech)
Budget Equals Estimate

Overall Assessment

Figure 2: Program Pedigree Confidence Self-Assessment

The dataset was initially comprised of 480 POEs across 162 programs. Some
these programs did have not all the necessary data for an analysis. Only 445 of the 480
POEs complied with standard estimate submission. There were several parts of the POE
submission missing or they only completed the budget portion of the POE submission.
Next, there were only 308 that completed the self-assessment tables. Some removed the
tables, others chose to leave them unfilled or blank. Finally, the data was analyzed
against the cost estimation data. An additional 34 did not have POE change estimation
data. The final dataset had 274 POE for statistical analysis. The POEs provided
development and production data. See Table 3 below:

25

Table 3: Database Inclusions/Exclusions

Criteria
Initial POE data provided by
AFLCMC
POE did not meet typical
submission formatting
POE missing selfassessment data
POE missing change
estimation data

Δ POEs

Total
POEs

Δ Programs

Total
Programs

+ 480

480

+ 201

201

- 35

445

- 10

191

- 137

308

- 12

179

- 34

274

- 17

162

While the data source is a rich set of programmatic insights, which the current
study can only begin to mine, it poses some challenges as well. A particular challenge
for the current study is that the POEs do not recur in a common regular basis. Some
programs may have one estimate per year, for others, every few years or irregularly, as
needed. How then to normalize the data in the quest to systematically determine a POEs
ability to predict future costs? One must identify how complete a program is when the
first POE appears, and one must determine how complete a program is for each
subsequent POE. And then one can begin to compare programs with like starting points
and like intervals.
The method used, was to take the first POE then the deviation was measured by
measuring the percent difference between the First POE and Last POEs. As stated they
have different intervals; thus to normalize the data, the cost growth was averaged per
annum for the period between the POE submissions. Equation:
Percent Cost Growth Per Year = (POE Obligations First Year - POE Obligations Latest)
((POE Date First Year - POE Date Latest)/12Months)
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Table 4 below provides a breakdown of the percent cost growth per annum data defining
the elements of calculation above.

Table 4: Percent Cost Growth per Annum Data
Term

Definition
The date of the initial or first Program Office Estimate Submitted

POE Date – First Year
POE Date – Latest

POE Obligations–First Year
POE Obligations-Latest

The date of the latest or final Program Office Estimate Submitted
The expenses reported from the initial or first Program Office Estimate Submitted
The expenses reported from the latest or final Program Office Estimate Submitted

POE Date Delta

The differences in month of the date reported from the first to latest Program Office
Estimate Submitted

POE Obligations Delta

The difference in expenses reported from the first to latest Program Office Estimate
Submitted

Percent Cost Growth Per
Year

The difference in expenses reported from the first to latest Program Office Estimate
Submitted divided by the difference in dates of Program Office Estimate Submitted
calculated per annum.

Additionally the percent complete was calculated by taking the expensed portion
of the POEs divided by the total cost. This was done as a measure of the program’s life
cycle using the percent work completed as stages: early, middle, late middle, and near
complete. The self-assessment analysis for program progress was shown by percent work
complete. Equation:
Percent Work Completed = POE Obligations Earliest/POE Total Cost

27

Data Collection
Collecting the data was a manual process of coding POE data from individual
files provided by AFLCMC. It included 480 POEs spanning from 2003 to 2018. From the
Program “Confidence” Pedigree self-assessment inputs. Variable data was collected
under seven designators: requirements definition, engineering technical baseline,
schedule baseline, cost data, crosschecks, risk assessment, and budget equals estimate.
The seven designators lead to an overall confidence self-assessment variable that rated
the entire program office estimate submission. Data was collected for the development
and production. The data was collected for use in this research and provided AFLCMC
with self-assessments that can be studied and analyzed to potentially aid in future POE
submissions.
Additionally, further variables were created for analysis of programs for
assessment and estimation. The appropriation growth per annum (cost growth), and the
POE percent change variables were created. The cost growth has the weakness of only
being a normalized average over the life span of the POE and is a limitation of the
dataset. This is due the data coming from the AFLCMC database where they have the
cost growth between two POE submission and the timeframe but due to all programs
having different durations the data is averaged per annum so different programs can be
compared.
Dummy variables were created to analyze POEs with high variance. Two
notional thresholds were chosen for the category of high variance: +/- 10% and +/- 20%.
There is no empirical foundation for such thresholds. However, these thresholds are
significant in an institutional sense. Nunn-McCurdy oversight legislation identifies a
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“significant” breach is when the current baseline estimate is breached by 15 % (Arena,
2014) 10% was, therefore, chosen as initial marker, low enough to stay below the
“significant breach” but still high enough to raise concern with the cost estimate.
The Percent Completed variable determined the percent complete by taking the
cost of the work complete and dividing it by the total cost. Percent complete was binned
into 4 groups of 25% intervals from 0% to 100% with 25% quartile breaks. The 25% bin
included data with percent complete from 0% to 25%, while the 50% bin included data
from the 25% to 50%, etc. Again, this simplifying approach was necessary because of
the irregularity of the POE frequency. For example, the Electronic Board Operation
Support System had a POE interval of less than a year, from 26 Sept 2013 to 11 Sept
2014. Conversely the MQ-9 Reaper an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) had a POE
interval of greater than eight years with dates from 2 Nov 2009 to 14 Mar 2018. These
are two extremes, but they accentuate the differences in the interval submissions.
An additional work completed variable was generated to provide greater
granularity in the tables. Percent complete was binned into 10 groups this time with 10%
intervals from 0% to 100%. The first 10% bin included data with percent complete from
0% to 10%, while the 20% bin included data from the 10% to 20%, and so on. Table 5
shows data base variables utilized in the statistical analysis.
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Table 5: Database Variables
Self-Assessment/Cost Estimation
Variables for Descriptive
Statistics

Dependent Variables for
Contingency Tables

Independent Variables for
Contingency Tables

Appropriation Growth Per
Annum

Overall Confidence

Percentage Change in Estimate

Overall Confidence G

Overall Confidence

Overall Confidence Y

POE Year

Overall Confidence R

DV Percent Change >10%

Percentage Change in Estimate

Schedule baseline

DV Percent Change >20%

Reason for Change in Estimate

Cost data

DV Percent Work Complete 25%

DV Percent Change >10%

Crosscheck

DV Percent Work Complete 10%

DV Percent Change >20%

Risk assessment

DV Percent Work Complete 25%

Budget equals estimate

POE Iteration
Appropriation Growth Per Annum

Requirement definition
Engineering technical baseline

DV Percent Work Complete 10%

Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Utilizing the database of 162 programs, self-assessment and cost growth estimates
from POEs was analyzed through descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics
consisted of the mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, first quartile, median,
and third quartile. Descriptive statistical analysis is used to summarize the selfassessment and cost growth data in the database. The mean and median values show the
typical self-assessment cost growth data for cost estimates. The standard deviation and
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variance are quantitative descriptions of the dispersion in the data. The minimum and
maximum values show the entire range of values in the data. Finally, quartiles provide a
visualization of the distribution of values. The quartiles are measure the 25th percentile
and 75th percentile of the data.
Contingency Table Analysis
The dataset generated many categorical variables to study. The Program Pedigree
Confidence Self-Assessment generated the categorical variables of engineering technical
baseline, schedule baseline, etc. Categorical variables were established for each
measurement of self-assessment in the data collection. The database contingency table
analysis identified potential variables effecting overall confidence in self-assessment as
well as cost growth in SPO programs. Continuous variables of cost growth in percentages
were looked at as categorical binary variables, or dummy variables (+/-10%, +/- 20%).
Additional dummy variables tying them to the color codes for green, red, and yellow selfassessment levels.
Contingency tables are used to test whether or not independent variables can
predict dependent variables. The typical statistical test that is used for contingency tables
is the Pearson test. However, the Pearson test fails requires a large sample size for the pvalue provided. Fisher’s Exact Tests are geared to account for small sample sizes within
contingency tables. Fisher’s Exact Test is different than the other statistical tests because
it is unconditioned in the number of rows and columns from its second assumption. The
Fisher’s Exact Test calculates the probability of getting the observed data. The p-value
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determines if there is significant effect. This research utilized a significant threshold pvalue of 0.05 to potentially explain the results of the self-assessment data.
In this research the contingency tables are used to test whether or not any of the
independent variables of quantity, schedule, engineering, estimating, economic, other,
and support could predict the dependent variable cost growth greater than +/- 10% as
method to determine what reasons drive large cost growth variations. Additionally,
contingency tables are used to test whether the percent work complete is a predictor of
Self-assessment overall confidence. Percent work complete was coded for each in 10%
intervals to give and idea where the program stands as it progresses through major
program reviews to including Milestones A, B, and C, etc. throughout the life cycle of the
program. This would determine if the overall confidence improves over the program’s
life cycle. The tests will be conducted on both development and production phases.
One-way analysis of variance (ANVOA)
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the significance selfassessment variables. It looked that the impact of time on the self-assessment overall
confidence if the p-value from the ANOVAs is less than 0.05 than the tested variable was
considered to be a significant predictor cost growth/cost variance as is relates to the
number of the POE submission, a proxy for time in the programs life cycle. ANOVA
was also completed on cost growth/cost variance versus percent work complete as second
check. The dataset was broken into subsets where the overall confidence Green and
overall confidence Yellow were studied separately. Due to the smaller sample size of
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some of the smaller subsets the nonparametric Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallace Tests were
used to test whether the differences in the means is significant using an alpha of 0.05.
Summary
This chapter started off with the source of the data how it was collected and categorized.
Then the chapter discussed the details of database formulation. Next, went into the
independent variables that are used in the analysis. Additionally, the statistical and
contingency table analysis were defined along with the thresholds for those estimate
factors. After this the chapter went through the methodology of the analysis and the
Fisher’s Exact Tests. Finally the chapter covered the ANOVA and fit tests.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the analysis and results of the
methodology outlined in Chapter III. The chapter finds the results of Investigative
Questions using descriptive statistical analysis and well as contingency table analysis as
measures of self-assessment and cost growth predictors. The results highlight significant
p-values for the tests and outcomes of these tests. The chapter concludes with a summary
of analysis of the results.
Investigative Questions Answered
4.1 Does confidence in a program increase through the course of a program, as one
would expect if the tool has some general validity?
To answer the research question, contingency table analysis was used to look at
the program office life cycle. Using the binned variables for percent work complete, the
overall confidence levels of Green, Red, and Yellow were compared to the percent work
complete with contingency tables. The variable created four 25% quartile breaks of the
percent work complete into four bins as explained in Chapter III. The results show the
actual occurrences for Green are far less in the first 25% than expected based on the
assumption that there is no relationship. Table 10 shows the dataset had only had 94
occurrences in the first quartile -- less than the expected value of 137.98 occurrences. By
the final quartile >75% complete Green had 85 occurrences but there was an expected
value of only 55.64 occurrences. The p-value for the Fisher’s Exact Test was statically
significant at <.0001. See Table 6.
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Table 6: Overall Confidence vs Work Complete

The Figure 3 below gives a nice visual respentation of the contingency as well. In
the first 25% quartile, green was underrepresented and yellow over represented when
compaired to their expected values, by the last quartile the opposite was true. There is a
statically significant difference in the number of programs with an overall confidence of
green as the percent work completed increases or as the POE submissions increase.
Figure 5 clearly depicts that the greater the percent work completed, the higher the
occurance of green overall confidence. It is iteresting to note that only two of the eighteen
Red incidences occur after 25% work complete.Once this level of work completion is
achieved, programs do not remain Red. The overrepesentation of Green at a statistically
significant level shows there is a dependent relationship between overall confidence and
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the percent work complete. The significance of the results comports with program office
self-assessments becoming more optimistic over the course a program life cycle. The
finding seems logical as the SPOs’ familiarity, methodology, confidence in the program
should only improve over time.

Figure 3: Overall Confidence vs Percent Work Complete-25% Intervals
4.2 What is the value of program office overall self-assessments as predictors of cost
estimating accuracy?
To answer research question two a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
performed on the data performed. The ANOVA bins each program based on its
confidence category (Green, Red, and Yellow). It then uses nonparametric tests to
compare the medians of the estimate deviations that follow.
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Figure 4: One-way ANOVA Overall Confidence vs Percent Change in Cost Estimate

The ANOVA results in figure 4 show Overall Confidence rating significantly
corresponds with the ensuing the Percent Change in Estimates. The means for each
category are 10.7% for the Green, 210.9% for Red and 75.9% for the Yellow. The fstatistic produced a p-value of 0.02. Due to the ordinal data and small sets of some of the
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samples, the nonparametric Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis Tests were used to compare the
medians and confirm that these differences were statistically significant. The test results
had a p-value of .001 confirming the statistical significance
Following this first examination, five significant outliers were removed to
determine whether the means were still significantly different after their removal. The
results remained significant in this analysis as well Figure 5 below. The analysis of the
data showed means to be -3.3% for the Green, 56.8% for Red and 19.4% for the Yellow.
This analysis supported the initial finding and assures that the difference in means in the
initial test was not due to the outliers but the means were different at a statically
significant level. Again Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis Tests confirmed the these medians
were statistically significant with a p-value of .001
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Figure 5: One-way ANOVA Overall Confidence vs Percent Change without outliers
After confirming difference in means from the first test, the removal of the Red
submissions was considered, due to the small number of Red values. A third ANOVA
test was run removing the Red inputs, and the data was analyzed again, this time only
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comparing the Green and Yellow means. The results remained significant with p-value of
.001. Additionally, the F Ratio increased to 10.86 further confirming that Green and
Yellow means are significantly different, as a greater F Ratio means greater variation
among group means Figure 6 below. The Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis Tests confirmed the
these differences as well comparing the medians and resulting in a p-value of .001

Figure 6: One-way ANOVA Overall Confidence vs Percent Change excluding Red
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Additionally, when doing the initial scatterplot review of the dataset, a boxplot
was produced (Figure 7). It analyzed the Green, Red, Yellow overall confidence rating.
Green has a much smaller inner quartile range of -5.39% to 3.68% when compared to
Yellow’s inner quartile range of -10.03% to 5.73%. This gives a nice visual
representation of the data and gives further credence to the notion that the higher overall
confidence in the self-assessment can be related to lower cost variation and better cost
estimation predictor.

Figure 7: Box Plot Cost Growth Per Annum vs Overall Confidence
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4.3 Which of the self-assessment confidence enablers are most predictive of future
variance?
To answer which of the self-assessment measures are the most valuable as predictors
of future, variance contingency tables were run on all the measures: requirements
definition, engineering technical baseline, schedule baseline, cost data, crosschecks, risk
assessment, and budget equals estimate. Each self-assessment measure was run by the
dummy variable >10% cost variation. These measures where run against both production
and development subsets out of the fourteen tests. Of the fourteen tests six produced
significant results four in development and two in production discussed below. The
complete results of all the contingency tables tests including the non-significant ones are
included in appendix D.
The four measures of development with significance were: cost data, crosschecks,
requirements, and schedule. The two measures of production with significant p-values
they are: risk assessment and budget equals estimate.
Looking at the development phase testing first, the results for the “cost data”
show the actual incidences for Green are greater than expected when cost variation is
<10%. The dataset had 63 occurrences greater than the expected value of 56.9
occurrences. Yellow on the other hand had 31 occurrences compared to an expected
value of 37.1 Green has more occurrences than expected when cost variance is lower than
10% and Yellow had more occurrence than expect when cost variance is higher than
10%. Therefore, we can determine the variables are dependent, that is cost data overall
confidence is different when the cost variation is >10%. The p-value for the Pearson Test
was statically significant at <.009 Table 7 below.
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Table 7: Development Cost Data Measure vs >10% Cost Variance

The results for “crosschecks” show the actual values for Green are greater than
the expected ones when cost variation is <10%. The dataset had 47 occurrences -- greater
than the expected value of 40.7 occurrences. Yellow on the other hand had 21
occurrences compared to an expected value of 27.3 Green has more occurrences than
expected when cost variance is lower than 10% and Yellow had more occurrence than
expect when cost variance is higher than 10%. The p-value for the Pearson Test was
statically significant at <.036 Table 8 below.
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Table 8: Development Crosscheck Measure vs >10% Cost Variance

“Requirements development” show the actual values for Green are greater than
the expected ones when cost variation is <10%. The dataset had 67 occurrences greater
than the expected value of 58.9 occurrences. Yellow had 31 occurrences compared to an
expected value of 39.1 Green has more occurrences than expected when cost variance is
lower than 10% and Yellow had more occurrence than expect when cost variance is
higher than 10%. The p-value for the Pearson Test was statically significant at <.005
Table 9 below.
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Table 9: Development Requirements Measure vs >10% Cost Variance

Finally, “schedule” shows the actual values for Green are greater than the
expected ones when cost variation is <10%. The dataset had 52 occurrences -- greater
than the expected value of 40.58 occurrences. Yellow on the other hand had 15
occurrences compared to an expected value of 26.42 Green has more occurrences than
expected when cost variance is lower than 10% and Yellow had more occurrence than
expect when cost variance is higher than 10%. The p-value for the Pearson Test was
statically significant at <.0002 Table 10 below. It is apparent that some categories have
no statistical significance or effect on overall confidence, conclusions of them as a whole
will be done in Chapter 5.
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Table 10: Development Schedule Measure vs >10% Cost Variance

Now we will discuss the results for the two procurement measures. The first
measure for procurement is “risk assessment.” The difference here from the previous
tests is due to the Green and Yellow results being closer to what they were expected their
means were not significantly different. A Student’s t test confirmed this Table 11 below.
It also shows that difference in Red’s means causes the statistical significance in
Schedule. The significant difference is only related to the incidences of red. Here the
dataset had 1 red occurrence when expected when cost variance was lower than 10% less
than the expected value of 4.16 occurrences and when cost variance was higher than 10%
there where 6 occurrences when only 2.84 where expected. The Pearson Test was
statically significant at <.0397 Table 12 below.
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Table 11: Production Risk Assessment Measure vs >10% Cost Variance Student’s
Test

Table 12: Production Risk Assessment Measure vs >10% Cost Variance

Finally, the results for the “budget equals estimate” show the actual values for
Yellow are greater than the expected ones when cost variation is <10%. Again the
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statistically significant production results are not driven by solely by Green. The dataset
had 46 occurrences greater than the expected value of 37.03 occurrences. Red, on the
other hand, had 14 occurrences compared to an expected value of 19.7 Yellow had more
occurrences than expected when cost variance is lower than 10% and Red had more
occurrence than expect when cost variance is higher than 10%. A Student’s t test
confirmed this Table 14 shows that Yellow is statistically different from Green and Red
The p-value for the Pearson Test was statically significant at <.005 Table 12 below.
Table 13: Production Budget Equals Estimate Measure vs >10% Cost Variance
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Table 14: Production Budget Equals Estimate Measure vs >10% Cost Variance
Student’s Test

Analysis of these results shows the relationship between the each of the six measures
and cost variation >10% were statically significant. Four all of the development
measures had a greater occurrence of Yellow or Red confidence level than would be
expected. This shows there is a higher chance of variation >10% for each of these
measures with the lower confidence levels Red and Yellow self-assessments in
development.
Breaking down the four development measures: cost data, crosschecks, requirements,
and schedule. “Requirements” and “schedule” are significant predictors. From the
Program office Pedigree instruction (Appendix A): Green rated “requirements” measure
means the requirements is complete, stable, and well delineated, compared to Yellow
rated requirements measure that are still in flux and may need assumptions to provide
enough information for a complete estimate. Schedule would seem to be a significant
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predictor of high cost variation was well. The difference between Green and Yellow rated
schedules is defined by well-documented integrated program schedule versus a
documented schedule which models some program risks. The two measures of
production with significant p-values are: risk assessment, budget equals estimate. A
possible explanation for a lower risk assessment is due to limited cost, schedule, and
technical risk assessment modeled into cost estimate. The existence of these conditions
would drive up cost variation. As for Budget equals estimate lower confidence level is
defined by some out-year budget disconnects with mitigation plans. Again this can
increase the variation in cost estimates.
The data supports using the measures with significant results from the program office
self-assessment as predictors. The six measures that were statistically significant all show
there is a difference when measures are assessed as Green, Yellow, or Red. Development
in particular showed the measures: cost data, crosschecks, requirements, and schedule are
significantly more likely to be Yellow or Red when the cost variance > 10% than if it is
less than 10%.

4.4 When does a program office self-assessment peak in confidence during a program?
When does confidence stabilize in a program?
To answer the research question, four contingency table analyses were used to
determine peaks periods. The data set was broken down into development and
production. Contingency table compared the overall confidence compared to percent
work complete. The overall confidence level was analyzed by the second percent work
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complete dummy variable. The dummy variable as discussed in Chapter III breaks the
work complete into 10% intervals from 0-10% to 90-100%.
The data was different for the two subsets and accentuates the differences of the
two stages. First, development Table 13 below shows the overall confidence didn’t peat
until the 90% complete stage. Here 90.48% of the overall confidence occurrences were
Green. Interestingly from 40%-80% work complete the overall confidence Green
occurred at around 60% with no real change or improvement in the development subset.
The Pearson test p-value of <.0001 shows that programs overall confidence is
significantly affected by the percent work completed.
Table 15: Development Overall Confidence vs Percent Work Complete-10%
Intervals
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Table 14 below shows the production overall confidence subset. It actually peaks
at 60% work complete with Green overall confidence occurring at 92.31%. Procurement
shows program offices are more confident than they are at similar stages in the
development work complete. Procurement Green overall confidence is at 68.41% when
the program has 20% of the work completed. The Pearson test p-value of <.0001 shows
that programs overall confidence is significantly affected by the percent work completed.
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Table 16: Production Overall Confidence vs Percent Work Complete-10% Intervals
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Figure 8: Cost Growth Per Annum vs Percent Work Complete-10% Intervals
Figure 8 supports the result of Tables 13 and 14. The first 10% work complete has 12%
variance. By 20% work complete the variance drops to 4% and while it has a few spikes
the greatest variance in in the first 10% of work complete. It supports self-assessments
improving as the greater amount of work is completed and as programs progress the
variation in cost growth drops.
Analysis of the results show program office self-assessments peak at different
time for development and procurement. It 20% work complete procurement had a Green
overall confidence occurrence of 68.41% for development this occurrence did not happen
until the work complete was a 80%. So program offices are far more confident in the
procurement stage than the development one. Within each, program offices where most
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confident in development at 80% work complete or once this stage was practically
finished. Procurement was not only more confident early but it peaked are 60% work
complete. This is significant because there is still a fair amount of work to be completed
after this point, but they are much more confident much earlier for procurement.
4.5 To what extent can we attribute changes in program estimates controllable factors?
The answer the fifth research question contingency tables analysis was used. The
contingency table analysis was done with the dummy variable >10% cost variation run
against the variable “reason for change” in program office estimates as discussed in the
Chapter III methodology. The overall confidence levels of Green, Red, and Yellow were
analyzed against the occurrences of the reason for change: quantity, schedule,
engineering, estimating, economic, scope, and support.
Table 17: Cost Growth >10% vs Reason for Change
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The results show the actual values for “estimating” as a reason for change are less
than expected when cost variation is >10%. Table 15 shows the dataset had only had 27
occurrences in the first quartile but an expected value of 35.84 occurrences. The
occurrence of quantity, schedule, and scope all more than expected when cost variation is
>10%. The p-value for the Fisher’s Exact Test was statically significant at <.008
These results support the idea that SPOs or the inputs they control have less
impact in larger variances POEs in cost estimation. From categories of quantity,
schedule, engineering, estimating, economic, other, and support they only have total
control of the estimating and even then this is dependent on the information provided by
others. The data showed that if there is a variation in a cost estimate of >10% a
significantly less portion of the changes were due to estimating than expected. In total
estimating accounts for 56% of the POE changes, however this drops to 42% when there
is a greater than >10% change. So while estimating errors may have the most occurrences
as to the reason of a POE change, they are typically smaller and of less impact than the
less frequent but greater cost growth impacting changes such as schedule or scope.
As mentioned in the lit review Bolten categorized the reasons for cost growth
similar the program office reason for change. These variance categories along with how
they classified the variance data showed the “realized” cost growth and decisions by the
government dominate the overall growth in both development and procurement. (Bolten,
2008). Showing that “realized” cost growth is often out of the program offices hand.
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The reoccurring theme of the Program office and the cost estimator being easy
targets to blame when growth cost occurs due to the responsibility of accurate cost
estimating is still valid. (DeNeve et al. 2015) However, while SPOs do have the greatest
percentage of changes the data has shown the cost variation of the reasons within their
control is significantly less than the reasons outside of their control. Can they continue to
strive for improvement and better estimates? Yes, but also there is only so much that they
can do given all of the other constraints as well. The issues are larger than the program
office and are only part of the solution to a greater problem.

4.6 Have cost estimates improved over time within the SPO? And has the technique of
self-assessment proved more valuable over time?
The answer the sixth research question first descriptive statistics were used. Cost
estimates where graphed against the program office’s the mean Appropriation Growth
per Annum calculation. The descriptive statistics of the dataset where analyzed for: mean,
variance, and quartiles. The POE dataset had a mean of -1.3% with a variance of 6.4%
The negative mean showed the dataset had slightly negative average cost growth for its
entirety. The dataset had tight upper and lower quartiles of 4.09% and -7.86. These
results tell us there most of the data is very close to the mean, more than half of the
estimates where within +/-5% of the mean.
Figure 9 shows a slight improvement of the total cost variation over time. Cost
estimates are closer to the goal 0.0% estimation error absolutely. However, there were no
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statistically significant results when the dataset was run for the mean Appropriation
Growth per Annum.

Figure 9: Total Cost Growth Per Annum vs POE Year

When divided out between development and procurement there are some
differences. Figure 10 shows a slight regression of the total cost variation over time for
development as the values spike and vary of time. This is somewhat understandable as
the programs are far less predictable in the development stage. Next we will compare it to
procurement.
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Figure 10: Development Cost Growth Per Annum vs POE Year

Figure 11 below shows the total cost variation in procurement. It has shown
marked improvement overtime. Recent trends are to the point of potential under
execution, but the program offices obviously have a stronger grasp of the programs at the
procurement stage as well as they are less likely to be impacted by factors outside of their
control.

Figure 11: Production Cost Growth Per Annum vs POE Year
The results and other literature show cost estimates may have slight improvement
over time within the SPO but nothing that is statistically significant. The data cannot
confirm that estimates at the SPO have improved over time and the literature agrees with
this as well. Younossi pointed out perhaps the most important finding of their analysis
was cost growth in the past three decades has remained high, with no significant
improvement. (Younossi, 2007) Even after reform WSARA stated new defense weapon
systems programs have done a better job staying within budget estimates but proceed
without the key knowledge essential to good acquisition outcomes (GAO, 2018)
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Has the technique of self-assessment proved more valuable over time? There is
value in self-assessment, as with any other factor being applied to cost growth. Selfassessment causes an organization to think and think critically. The Program offices can
see how they truly are performing and give them a chance to evaluate their program
critically. The literature has shown self-assessment tools can aid an organization provided
they are proper procedures are followed on how to complete the assessment. Selfassessment can be defined as a ‘learning process’ organizations need more information
before making a decision along with technical support and instruments to guide them.
Tying it to the SPOs specifically greater familiarity with the assessment criteria
will provide value two-fold. First, it will allow the organization better to understand all
the processes being utilized. And secondly it will allow them to see where the specific
program stands and allow the organization to review programs to categorize for better
priority or focus.
Summary
Chapter IV analyzed the results for the investigative questions with descriptive
statistics and contingency table analysis. Additionally, the results and any significant
findings were used to answer the investigative questions. Differences between green and
yellow overall confidence assessments where found, however there was little explanatory
power to the tests. Chapter V draws conclusions about Self-assessment and future
research recommendations.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This chapter concludes form results the value and usefulness of self-assessment
by discussing the limitations of the research, recommendation for future research, and
final thoughts on self-assessment
Limitations
While the findings of this study had some significant results, limitations exist in
this research. Data from is only from AFLCMC and their POEs deeper analysis into
other agency’s SPOs would be needed to better understand the value DoD wide. More
data must be made available across all agencies to have better data sets and improve
analysis.
Additionally, a Green, Yellow, Red tool has its limitations. By only having three
categories to choose from there is little room for differentiation. While conducting a data
collection, assessors wanted to add a level of Green-Yellow or Yellow-Red stratification
to the self-assessment, but the Program Office Self-Assessment instructions only identify
the three level of color coding. Furthermore, continued learning on POE submission
requirements should ensure all submissions have a uniform self-assessment template to
eliminate any variation.
Recommendations for Future Research
Further research could tie into specific cost growth methodologies within the POE
database. Utilizing the self-assessment overall confidence to see if program offices are
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more confident in certain methodologies. Additionally, specific program types or offices
could be studied to see if there is any correlation between them and self-assessment or
overall program confidence. Further study could be done with the self-assessments
database and other program offices as there are limits to what we can learn within one
SPO.
AFLCMC database has significant untapped resources with over seventeen years
of historical program office data on PDF files. The POE files contain specific research
materiel for example Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) within the POE briefing could
be researched and coded for further analysis.
Final Thoughts
This thesis explored the nature of self-assessment. The literature has identified
self-assessments as staple of many organizations has value. Self-assessments have the
potential to be a useful tool in an organization. Self-assessment not only teach the
members of an organization to think critically, it guides them while making decisions and
generating solutions. When conducting an assessment, the assessor should always be
aware of over confidence on the assessment.
The self-assessment may have overall value the specific measures can have individual
values as well. There were four measures of development with significant results: cost
data, crosschecks, requirements, and schedule. Closely tracking these measures,
specifically requirements and schedule would be of value as they are indicators of greater
cost variation. At the production stage risk assessment and budget equals estimate were
significant. The fact that the measures are different signals a change in the self-
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assessment from the development to the production stage. SPOs should now focus on
budget estimation and mitigating risk. Closer inspection of these specific program
measures could lead to improved overall confidence in the programs and as the data
supports reduce the likelihood of cost variation.
Tying this back to program office estimates the self-assessment has a role in
monitoring and tracking programs. There were significant differences between the
variance of Green and Yellow Overall Confidence levels. So the value in knowing that
the self-assessment can give a quick idea on how the program will perform. This stop
light assessment presented is presented on the program office estimates. At this time the
current state of the self-assessment tools seems the most warranted for the SPOs.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Self-Assessment Program Confidence Criteria MS-A-Pre MS-B
PROGRAM "Confidence" PEDIGREE
"PROGRAM REALISM is needed to achieve COST REALISM"
Program Name:

Confidence
Enablers

Program Phase: MS-A - Pre MS-B

"HIGH"
Confidence

"MEDIUM"
Confidence

Date:

"LOW"
Confidence

Requirements
Definition

- Complete, stable, user approved/coordinated
set of high level functional and performance
requirements that define system attributes Few assumptions required - Documented
program plan/acquisition strategy with
sufficient detail for a comprehensive cost
estimate

- Generally understood, some functional and - Requirements in deliberation - Multiple major
performance requirements still in flux but not
assumptions required to complete estimate
major cost drivers - Requirements change
process with senior level gatekeeper in place Assumptions required to provide enough
information to complete estimate are provided
by appropriate functional lead

Engineering
Technical
Baseline

The descriptions in the baseline support
defining major hardware, software and
integration elements and provide reasonable
insights into greatest risk areas and cost
drivers at the subsytem level. The system as
a whole is well characterized; reference design
is documented. Ground rules and
assumptions are well documented. All DoD
5000.02 documents are leveraged.

The system is described is sufficient detail to
support identification of high level analogies
and application of parametric modeling. Many
but not all DoD 5000.02 documents are
leveraged. A high-level reference design with
some assumptions forms the technical basis
of the cost estimate.

The descriptions in the baseline are vague and
incomplete, even at the system level. DoD
5000.02 documents are not leveraged.
Significant uncertainty about system
architecture and technical approach.

- Comprehensive but higher level documented
schedule which models some program risks.
Based on schedule analysis for individual
tasks required, but lacks full integration.
Coordinated with acquisition strategy.

- Top level notional schedule lacking definition
to model program risks. Downward
directed,based on user need date, NOT
duration and complexity of tasks required.
Lacks coordination with acquisition strategy.

- CERs, commercial models, or analogies to
less similar but like function programs used to
estimate a at a level of detail consistent with
tech baseline and requirements maturity.
Estimators re-validated any re-used
methodologies from other estimates for
relevance. Estimating consistent with
guidance in AF Cost Analysis Handbook.
- Few crosschecks available – generally
support the estimate

- Commercial parametric models or manpower
build-up (lacking historical substantiation)
used as primary methodologies. Limited use
of analogous data.

- Limited cost, schedule, and technical risk
assessment modeled into cost estimate but in
compliance with JA Cost, Schedule, Risk, &
Uncertainty Handbook. Cost estimate
integrates identified program risks but the
cost/phasing impact of these risks CANNOT
be discreetly identified; Sufficiently broad CDF
for a program at this stage of it's lifecycle.

- Little or no cost, schedule, and technical risk
assessment modeled into cost estimate or
risk modeled based on generic assumptions
by the cost estimator. Narrow CDF for a
program at this phase in the lifecycle.

Schedule Baseline - Comprehensive, detailed well documented

Cost Data &
Methodology

Crosscheck(s)

Risk Assessment
(Cost/Schedule/
Tech)

Budget equals
Estimate

Overall
Assessment

integrated program schedule with durations,
logic, and "what if" (impact on task duration)
analysis completed for potential risks. Based
on schedule analysis for the tasks required,
that has been vetted with cost, design,
engineering and test organizations.
Coordinated with acquisition strategy
- CERs or analogies to similar programs used
to estimate a at a level of detail consistent
with tech baseline and requirements maturity.
Estimators re-validated any re-used
methodologies from other estimates for
relevance. Estimating consistent with
guidance in AF Cost Analysis Handbook.
- Estimate cost drivers have been
crosschecked with historical/actual data on
similar programs and are supportive of the
program estimate results
- Comprehensive cost, schedule, and technical
risk assessment modeled into cost estimate
in compliance with JA Cost, Schedule, Risk, &
Uncertainty Handbook, and cost estimating
best practices. Cost estimate integrates
identified program risks and the cost/phasing
impact of these risks can be discreetly
identified; Sufficiently broad CDF for a program
at this stage of it's lifecycle. Ranges of
highest risk/uncertainty areas and cost drivers
based on well documented technical baseline
and vetted with appropriate engineering or
functional OPRs.
- Virtually no disconnects between program
estimate and budget

- No appropriate cross-checks used or results
do not support estimate

- No near-term disconnects between estimate - Major disconnects between program
and budget, Some out-year disconnects with
Estimate and budget
mitigation plans

Provide an overall assessment of the program Estimate Confidene. No program with a "red" in any category can be assessed higher than a
yellow, "yellow" and "red" results must be documented in findings.
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Appendix B
Self-Assessment Program Confidence Criteria MS-B-Pre MS-C

PROGRAM "Confidence" PEDIGREE
"PROGRAM REALISM is needed to achieve COST REALISM"
Program Name:

Confidence
Enablers

Program Phase: Approaching MSB - MS-C

"HIGH"
Confidence

"MEDIUM"
Confidence

Date:

"LOW"
Confidence

Requirements
Definition

- Complete, stable, user approved/coordinated
set of requirements - (well delineated and
cross-referenced CDD and SRD; APB in
place). Requirements management strictly
controlled; changes reflected in cost updates)
Few assumptions required - Documented
program plan/acquisition strategy with
sufficient detail for a comprehensive cost
estimate

- Generally understood, some areas still in
- Requirements in deliberation - Multiple major
flux but not major cost drivers - Requirements assumptions required to complete estimate
change process with senior level gatekeeper in
place - Assumptions required to provide
enough information to complete estimate but
provided by appropriate functional lead; Able to
assess cost and schedule risk associated
with requirements uncertainty or instability.

Engineering
Technical
Baseline

The descriptions are comprehensive and
costable at the subsystem level. Integration
and test at subsystem and system levels
defined. Program strategies (technology
development, acquisition/contracting, etc) are
summarized and assessed to enable
evaluation of cost and risk impact. Nonmission equipment cost elements are
described for all life cycle phases. The
baseline reflects all recent changes to program
strategies. All DoD 5000.02 documents are
fully leveraged.
- Comprehensive, detailed well documented
integrated program schedule with durations,
logic, and "what if" (impact on task duration)
analysis completed for potential risks. Based
on schedule analysis for the tasks required.
Coordinated with contractor IMS.

Subsystems and non-mission equipment
elements are described in enough detail to
support identification and cost analysis of key
risks and all cost drivers. All DoD 5000.02
documents are fully leveraged.

At the subsystem level, descriptions are
incomplete and vague. Many 5000.02
documents ignored or underutilized. Or, the
program merely references contractor's
knowledge base without maintaining an
independent, objective, and up-to-date
description of the product baseline and all cost
elements.

- Comprehensive, high level, documented
schedules which may, or may not, be fully
integrated . Coordinated with contractor IMS.

- Top level notional schedule lacking definition
to model program risks. Based on user need
date, NOT duration of tasks required.

Cost Data &
Methodology

- Actuals on same program or very analogous
program and/or parametric data at a
comprehensive level of detail for virtually every
Level 3 WBS element. Estimators re-validated
any re-used methodologies from other
estimates for relevance. Estimating consistent
with guidance in AF Cost Analysis Handbook.

- Analogous and/or parametric data on
somewhat relevant programs for most Level 3
WBS elements Estimators re-validated any reused methodologies from other estimates for
relevance. Estimating consistent with
guidance in AF Cost Analysis Handbook.

- Commercial parametric models or manpower
build-up (lacking historical substantiation)
used as primary methodologies. Limited use
of analogous data.

Crosscheck(s)

- Estimate cost drivers have been
crosschecked with historical/actual data on
similar programs and are supportive of the
program estimate results
- Comprehensive cost, schedule, and technical
risk assessment modeled into cost estimate
in compliance with JA Cost, Schedule, Risk, &
Uncertainty Handbook, and cost estimating
best practices. Cost estimate integrates
identified program risks and the cost/phasing
impact of these risks can be discreetly
identified; Sufficiently broad CDF for a program
at this stage of it's lifecycle. Ranges of highest
risk/uncertainty areas and cost drivers based
on well documented technical baseline and
vetted with appropriate engineering or
functional OPRs.

- Few crosschecks available – generally
support the estimate

- No appropriate cross-checks used or results
do not support estimate

- Limited cost, schedule, and technical risk
assessment modeled into cost estimate but in
compliance with JA Cost, Schedule, Analysis,
Risk, & Uncertainty Handbook. Cost estimate
integrates identified program risks but the
cost/phasing impact of these risks CANNOT
be discreetly identified; Sufficiently broad CDF
for a program at this stage of it's lifecycle.

- Little or no cost, schedule, and technical risk
assessment modeled into cost estimate or
risk modeled based on generic assumptions
by the cost estimator. Narrow CDF for a
program at this phase in the lifecycle.

- Virtually no disconnects between program
estimate and budget

- No near-term disconnects between estimate - Major disconnects between program
and budget, Some out-year disconnects with Estimate and budget
mitigation plans

Schedule Baseline

Risk Assessment
(Cost/Schedule/
Tech)

Budget equals
Estimate

Overall
Assessment

Provide an overall assessment of the program Estimate Confidene. No program with a "red" in any category can be assessed higher than a
yellow, "yellow" and "red" results must be documented in findings.
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Appendix C
Self-Assessment Program Confidence Criteria Post MS-C
PROGRAM "Confidence" PEDIGREE
"PROGRAM REALISM is needed to achieve COST REALISM"
Program Name:

Confidence
Enablers

Program Phase: Post MS-C

Date:

"HIGH"
Confidence

"MEDIUM"
Confidence

"LOW"
Confidence

Requirements
Definition

- Complete, stable, user approved/coordinated
set functional/performance requirements
verified by DT&E and OT&E (CPD and product
baseline stable). Required delivery/deployment
quantities and schedules clear.Unmet/deferred requirements and strategy for
future capability increments/blocks/releases
clearly delineated. - Documented program
plan/acquisition strategy with sufficient detail
for a comprehensive cost estimate

- Well understood, including any requirements
changes likely to impact production
configuration and possibly require
reintegration/test in development environmentRequirements change process with senior
level gatekeeper in place - Assumptions
required to provide enough information to
complete estimate and assess risk, provided
by appropriate functional lead

- Requirements in deliberation likely to cause
undefined change and delay in
production/deployment configuration - Multiple
major assumptions required to complete
estimate

Engineering
Technical
Baseline

Descriptions of mission equipment and
collateral cost elements are comprehensiove
and costable at the component level. The
baseline reflects all recent changes to the
sustainment approach, etc. All DoD 5000.02
documents fully leveraged.

Descriptions are comprehensive and costable,
but only at the subsystem level. All DoD
5000.02 documents are fully leveraged. There
is some user iteration, but limited.

The baseline lacks comprehensiveness and
details approprate for this level of maturity. Or,
program merely references contractor's
knowledge base without maintaining an
independent, objective, and up-to-date
description of the product baseline and all cost
elements.

- Comprehensive, high level, documented
schedules which may, or may not, be fully
integrated . Coordinated with contractor IMS.

- Top level notional schedule lacking definition
to model program risks. Based on user need
date, NOT duration of tasks required.

- Analogous and/or parametric data on
somewhat relevant programs for most Level 3
WBS elements Estimators re-validated any reused methodologies from other estimates for
relevance. Estimating consistent with
guidance in JA Cost, Schedule, Risk, &
Uncertainty Handbook.

- Commercial parametric models or manpower
build-up (lacking historical substantiation)
used as primary methodologies. Limited use
of analogous data.

- Few crosschecks available – generally
support the estimate

- No appropriate cross-checks used or results
do not support estimate

- Limited cost, schedule, and technical risk
assessment modeled into cost estimate but in
compliance with JA Cost, Schedule, Risk, &
Uncertainty Handbook. Cost estimate
integrates identified program risks but the
cost/phasing impact of these risks CANNOT
be discreetly identified; Sufficiently broad CDF
for a program at this stage of it's lifecycle.

- Little or no cost, schedule, and technical risk
assessment modeled into cost estimate or
risk modeled based on generic assumptions
by the cost estimator. Narrow CDF for a
program at this phase in the lifecycle.

Schedule Baseline - Comprehensive, detailed well documented

Cost Data &
Methodology

Crosscheck(s)

Risk Assessment
(Cost/Schedule/
Tech)

Budget equals
Estimate

Overall
Assessment

integrated program schedule with durations,
logic, and "what if" (impact on task duration)
analysis completed for potential risks. Based
on schedule analysis for the tasks required.
Coordinated with contractor IMS. Delivery
schedule also coordinated with user
install/deployment needs.
- Actuals on same program or very analogous
program and/or parametric data at a
comprehensive level of detail for virtually every
Level 3 WBS element. Estimators re-validated
any re-used methodologies from other
estimates for relevance. Estimating consistent
with guidance in JA Cost, Schedule, Risk, &
Uncertainty Handbook.
- Estimate cost drivers have been
crosschecked with historical/actual data on
similar programs and are supportive of the
program estimate results
- Comprehensive cost, schedule, and technical
risk assessment modeled into cost estimate
in compliance with JA Cost, Schedule, Risk &
Uncertainty Handbook, and cost estimating
best practices. Cost estimate integrates
identified program risks and the cost/phasing
impact of these risks can be discreetly
identified; Sufficiently broad CDF for a program
at this stage of it's lifecycle. Ranges of highest
risk/uncertainty areas and cost drivers based
on well documented technical baseline and
vetted with appropriate engineering or
functional OPRs.
- Virtually no disconnects between program
estimate and budget

- No near-term disconnects between estimate - Major disconnects between program
and budget, Some out-year disconnects with Estimate and budget
mitigation plans

Provide an overall assessment of the program Estimate Confidene. No program with a "red" in any category can be assessed higher than a
yellow, "yellow" and "red" results must be documented in findings.
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Appendix D
Table D1 Contingency Table Results Development Budget Equals Estimate Measure
vs >10% Cost Variance
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Table D2 Contingency Table Results Development Cost Data Measure vs >10%
Cost Variance
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Table D3 Contingency Table Results Development Crosscheck Measure vs >10%
Cost Variance
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Table D4 Contingency Table Results Development Engineering Technical Baseline
Measure vs >10% Cost Variance
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Table D5 Contingency Table Results Development Requirements Measure vs >10%
Cost Variance
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Table D6 Contingency Table Results Development Risk Assessment Measure vs
>10% Cost Variance
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Table D7 Contingency Table Results Development Schedule Measure vs >10% Cost
Variance
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Table D8 Contingency Table Results Procurement Budget Equal Estimate Measure
vs >10% Cost Variance
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Table D9 Contingency Table Results Procurement Cost Data Measure vs >10%
Cost Variance
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Table D10 Contingency Table Results Procurement Crosschecks Measure vs >10%
Cost Variance
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Table D11 Contingency Table Results Procurement Engineering Technical Baseline
Measure vs >10% Cost Variance
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Table D12 Contingency Table Results Procurement Requirements Measure vs
>10% Cost Variance
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Table D13 Contingency Table Results Procurement Risk Assessment Measure vs
>10% Cost Variance
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Table D14 Contingency Table Results Procurement Schedule Measure vs >10%
Cost Variance
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